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Abstract 
 
 
The Eurozone official sector has declared that the belated 
restructuring of Greek bonds held by private sector creditors in 2012 was a 
“unique and exceptional” event, never, ever to be repeated in any other 
Eurozone country.  Maybe so.  But if this assurance proves in time to be as 
fragile as the official sector’s prior pronouncements on the subject of “private 
sector involvement” in Eurozone sovereign debt problems, any future 
Eurozone debt restructuring will be surely plagued by the problem of non-
participating creditors --- holdouts.  Indeed, it is the undisguised fear of 
holdouts and the prospect of a messy, Argentine-style debt restructuring in 
the belly of Europe that has been one of the principal motivations for the 
official sector’s willingness to use its taxpayer money to repay, in full and on 
time, all of the private sector creditors of Eurozone countries receiving 
bailouts (the belated Greek restructuring being the sole exception). 
This article argues that a simple amendment of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (the Eurozone’s new bailout 
facility) could immunize within the confines of the Eurozone the assets of a 
Eurozone country receiving ESM bailout assistance from attachment by 
litigious holdout creditors.  By thus increasing the difficulties that holdouts 
would face in enforcing court judgments against a debtor country, the 
objective of the amendment is to deflate creditor expectations that staying 
out of an ESM-supported sovereign debt restructuring will lead to a 
preferential recovery for the holdouts. 
This measure would also, when taken together with the other 
steps that the Eurozone has already implemented, substantially replicate the 
important features of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism proposed 
by the IMF in 2002. 
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The architects of every Eurozone sovereign bailout program 
(Cyprus is the one in the oven at the moment) must make a crucial threshold 
decision: what to do with the sovereign’s debt maturing during the program 
period.  Mercifully, there are only two options -- pay it or restructure it. 
The “pay it” alternative 
Paying maturing debt requires the country to borrow the funds 
from some source.  Again, there are only two options:  borrow from the 
market to refinance maturities during the program period or borrow from 
official sector bailout facilities like the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
By definition, a country that enjoys market access at tolerably 
low interest rates would not now be negotiating an official sector bailout 
package, so genuine market refinancing is foreclosed.  One possible solution 
is to arrange for an official sector actor (the European Central Bank 
volunteered for this role last September) to soften up the beaches by 
purchasing the debtor country’s bonds in the secondary market in order to 
depress the yields on those instruments.  This, the theory goes, will allow the 
country to issue new bonds in the primary market at coupon levels that 
benefit from official sector intervention.  If necessary, the ESM could also 
purchase some of those new bonds when they are issued in the primary 
market.  The combination of ECB/ESM intervention would thus operate as an 
official sector bailout masquerading as a normal market borrowing. 
                                                 
Paper prepared for presentation at the European University of Cyprus (Nicosia), January 30, 
2013.  The authors are, respectively, at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP; Duke Law 
School; Universidad Autonoma de Madrid. For background information on Cyprus, thanks to 
Alexander Apostolides and Fiona Mullen. 
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The “restructure it” alternative 
The obvious question in these affairs is why ever would the 
official sector entertain the idea of using taxpayer funds to pay out, in full and 
on time, a debtor country’s existing creditors?  One might have thought that 
the official sector’s fiduciary duty to its taxpayers would require the architects 
of these programs to reduce or defer, to the fullest extent possible, the 
liabilities that will need to be covered by official sector lending.  Indeed it is 
precisely this sense of a fiduciary duty to their own taxpayers that 
presumably justifies the official sector’s insistence that the recipient country 
pare its budget deficit to the bare minimum by embracing fiscal austerity, and 
maximize the country’s own contribution through privatization programs, 
before official sector monies are used to cover the residual shortfall. 
But this sense of fiduciary duty has thus far (with one 
exception) stopped short of asking, or demanding, or for that matter even 
permitting the recipient countries to reschedule their existing debts in order to 
remove those liabilities from the list of items that must be paid using official 
sector bailout funds.1  The bailout programs for Greece (until the official 
sector reversed course and permitted a restructuring of private sector debt in 
early 2012), Ireland and Portugal have each treated maturing debt as an 
inviolable component of the recipient country’s balance sheet, one that 
cannot and should not be subjected to any measures that would mitigate the 
gross amount of official sector funding that must be poured into the recipient 
country.  The single exception to this rule was the belated, but successful, 
Greek debt restructuring in the spring of 2012; an event that the official 
sector continues to describe as “unique and exceptional” and never to be 
repeated in another Eurozone country.  If you believe that assurance, you 
may stop reading this article now.2 
The justifications 
Why?  If official sector negotiators have learned to steel their 
hearts against the pleas of the old age pensioners, the unemployed, the 
homeless, the sick, the blind and the lame in bailout recipient countries, why 
should they show such solicitude for the country’s creditors?  Why, to put the 
                                                 
1
 The philosophy behind this policy was expressed by a former member of the Executive 
Board of the ECB in these terms:  “The only way to protect taxpayers in ‘virtuous’ countries 
is to avoid over-indebted countries from easily getting away with not paying their debts; the 
payment of debts should be enforced, through sanctions if need be.”  Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, 
“Private Sector Involvement:  From (good) Theory to (bad) Practice (Berlin, June 6, 2011) 
(available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110606.en.html). 
2
 Of course, if the Eurozone members really believed this assurance, there would have been 
no need for them to mandate the inclusion of an aggregated collective action clause in every 
Eurozone sovereign bond issued after January 1, 2013.  Those clauses serve only one 
function -- to facilitate a future restructuring or amendment of the affected debt stocks. 
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question in a lurid way, should the official sector insist that cancer patients in 
the recipient country forego their medicine in the interests of salutary “fiscal 
adjustment” but simultaneously recoil at visiting some discomfort on a hedge 
fund manager in Greenwich, Connecticut who holds the country’s debt 
obligations? 
The predictable answer from the official sector negotiators will 
be, “it’s complicated.”  Here, insofar as we have been given the light to see 
them, are the complications: 
National pride.    “Europeans pay their debts”, is how former 
President Nicolas Sarkozy phrased it; a statement that showed a remarkably 
shallow grasp of European history.3  Volumes have been written about the 
serial debt default records of many European countries.  But the spirit of 
President Sarkozy’s statement shines through.  A sovereign debt 
restructuring, he believed, would be tantamount to an admission of emerging 
market status.  It would be inconsistent with the dignity, with the gloire, of a 
modern European nation. 
Contagion. With the entire periphery of Europe in the line of 
fire, might not a debt restructuring in any one of them ignite a conflagration 
that would soon engulf them all?  If you had to restructure the debts of all of 
them, that would surely destabilize the global banking industry.  And from 
there it is a short path to planetary ruin.  This, more or less, is how the 
contagion argument is typically formulated. 
Incestuous relationships.   Were all of these debts owed 
exclusively to Greenwich, Connecticut-based hedge funds, the official sector 
negotiators might say, then restructuring those liabilities would be permitted, 
nay gleefully permitted.  But they are not.  A substantial part of the paper is 
likely to be held by financial institutions in the sovereign’s own country -- 
banks, insurance companies and pension funds.  Restructuring those 
instruments will therefore undermine the health of the domestic financial 
system.  Every euro saved in debt service might need to be spent in bank 
recapitalizations.  Moreover, much of the balance of the paper will be in the 
hands of banks in northern European countries, the very countries that will 
be making the largest contributions to the bailout funding.  To this extent, 
what appears to be a generous sovereign bailout of an overextended 
neighbor is in reality a disguised recapitalization of the banking sectors in the 
major contributing countries.  (The lesson?  All future Eurozone sovereign 
bond issuances should be placed exclusively with investors domiciled in the 
township of Greenwich, Connecticut, and secondary market transfers of 
those instruments should be confined to the geographical boundaries of that 
township.)  
                                                 
3
 The full statement was “We will show that Europeans pay their debts.”  Upfront, at p. 1, 
International Financing Review (Dec. 10, 2011)  
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Feasibility. Finally, there is the matter of the technical 
feasibility of a debt restructuring in these circumstances.  The bane of 
sovereign debt restructurers over the last 30 years has been the problem of 
holdout (non-participating) creditors.  Creditors left behind in a sovereign 
debt restructuring cause these problems: 
 If there are enough of them, the financial predicates 
underlying the entire restructuring may be undone. 
 If holdouts are subsequently paid in full, it makes the 
participating creditors look silly and this leads, in the next 
restructuring, to even more holdouts. 
 If holdouts are not paid after the restructuring closes, they 
pose an on-going litigation and attachment threat to the 
sovereign debtor; witness Argentina’s decade-long legal fight 
with thousands of holders of the Argentine bonds that went 
into default in 2001. 
Various techniques have been deployed in an effort to cajole, 
seduce, bludgeon or rope recalcitrant creditors into the restructuring process, 
none of them wholly successful.  Holdouts were not a lethal threat in the 
Greek debt restructuring of 2012 for only one reason:  93% of Greek bonds 
were governed by local (Greek) law.  This permitted the Greek Parliament to 
retrofit a collective action mechanism on the local law debt stock that 
operated to sweep potential holdouts into the deal.  Greece did have a small 
holdout population in this restructuring (equal to about 3% of the total eligible 
debt), but these holdouts were concentrated in the country’s foreign law-
governed bonds.  Not every Eurozone country, however, enjoys this local law 
advantage.  Local law-governed bonds represent a minority of the overall 
debt stocks in some of the smaller Eurozone countries and in the borrowings 
by many sub-sovereign entities such as provinces and municipalities.  In 
addition, many Eurozone sovereigns will have some portion of their debt 
stock in the form of foreign law-governed bonds; the most fertile ground for 
the sprouting of holdout seedlings. 
The threat of a significant holdout creditor population will 
therefore haunt the debt restructuring of almost any Eurozone country.  The 
conventional method of minimizing such holdouts -- threatening to consign all 
those who refuse the restructuring offer to the outer darkness of permanent 
default -- is unlikely to be effective in this situation.  Local holders of such 
bonds may possibly be persuaded by the government to roll their positions.  
But foreign holders can literally smell the official sector’s fear of a messy 
sovereign debt workout in Europe.  No one is eager to bring Argentina to the 
belly of Europe.  If the market had any lingering doubts about the matter, a 
surfeit of official sector statements over the last three years have painted 
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such an event as a catastrophe rivaling the Pleistocene ice age.4  In short, 
some creditors will surely call the bluff of a threatened permanent sovereign 
default in the Eurozone. 
 
What can be done? 
As shown by the Greek debt restructuring of 2012, with a bit of 
ingenuity and courage the other concerns about a Eurozone sovereign debt 
restructuring -- national pride, risk of contagion and incestuous 
sovereign/banking sector linkages -- can be satisfactorily addressed.  
Holdouts, however, will be a ubiquitous problem.   
The choice of a foreign law to govern a sovereign debt 
instrument will place it beyond the reach of the debtor’s own legislature.  The 
holder will therefore in all likelihood be able to reduce the claim to a foreign 
court judgment, sometimes within a matter of months.  With that judgment in 
hand, the creditor can then begin to exert pressure on the sovereign 
borrower by attempting to attach the sovereign’s off-shore assets (other than 
those, like embassies, that enjoy a special immunity), interfere with the 
sovereign’s fund-raising efforts abroad and perhaps (the subject of pending 
litigation in New York at the moment) intercept payments made on the 
borrower’s other debt obligations.  It is in this ability to exert post-judgment 
pressure on the sovereign borrower that the hopes of a holdout creditor for a 
preferential settlement principally reside. 
The first step in assessing the potential legal threat posed by 
holdout creditors is to read the underlying debt instruments to see what 
defenses the documents might provide to a sovereign defendant in a firefight.  
The Republic of Cyprus Euro MTN documentation (June 17, 2011), for 
example, offers a good illustration.  Condition 7(c) of the Terms and 
Conditions of the Cypriot Notes provides: 
All payments are subject in all cases to any 
applicable fiscal or other laws, regulations and 
directives, but without prejudice to the provisions 
of [the tax gross-up clause]. 
  
                                                 
4
 See, for example, the spectacularly ill-timed and ill-titled IMF Staff Position Note, “Default in 
Today’s Advanced Economies:  Unnecessary, Undesirable and Unlikely” (Sept. 1, 2010) 
(available http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1012.pdf).  This paper was 
released ten months before Greece, largely at the insistence of the IMF, was told to 
restructure what remained of its private sector debt. 
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Does this include Cypriot laws, regulations and directives?  
Nota bene that the provision does not say “laws, regulations and directives in 
the place of payment”.5  Read literally, therefore, it makes all payments 
subject in all cases to any Cypriot laws, regulations and directives.  Our 
research suggests that in approximately three-quarters of the other sovereign 
bonds that contain this provision, the crucial words “in the place of payment” 
modify the phrase “laws, regulations and directives”.6  The absence of this 
qualifying phrase in Cypriot bonds is thus both noticeable and arguably 
significant. 
Sticking with the Cypriot MTNs for a moment, Condition 19(e) 
of the Notes states that: 
“The waivers [of sovereign immunity for Republic 
property] and consents [to enforcement 
proceedings in foreign courts, including 
enforcement against Republic assets] …do not 
apply to the Republic’s title or possession of 
property … necessary for the proper functioning 
of the Republic as a sovereign state.”   
This is a very unusual way to phrase a carveout from the 
waiver of immunity for sovereign property devoted to a public purpose.  It is 
hard to imagine that an issuer benefiting from such a carveout would not, in a 
litigation scenario, argue that all of its property held abroad was necessary 
for the proper functioning of the sovereign state and therefore immune from 
seizure by a disgruntled creditor. 
While a close textual analysis of the sovereign’s bond 
documentation may yield some potential litigation defenses, such defenses 
are obviously useful only in an enforcement proceeding commenced by a 
holdout creditor. The whole point of the exercise is to persuade creditors in 
advance not to stay out of the restructuring and litigate.  A more generally 
applicable legal tool may be required for this purpose. 
We believe that the Eurozone has within its power a unique 
ability to deflate expectations on the part of prospective holdouts that they 
will realize a higher recovery by staying out of the sovereign restructuring.  
The goal of such a measure would be to affect the creditor calculus of 
whether to stay out of a Eurozone sovereign debt restructuring in the first 
place.  Nothing can realistically be done to keep a holdout from obtaining a 
judgment in a foreign court on a foreign law-governed debt instrument.  
Attempting to unseat basic tenets of contract law in countries like the United 
Kingdom (most foreign law-governed Eurozone sovereign bonds choose 
                                                 
5
 The place of payment will typically be a foreign location such as Luxembourg or London. 
6
 This provision is typical in bonds governed by English law. 
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English law) will meet fierce resistance.  But the Eurozone governments 
could immunize from creditor attachment the assets of a Eurozone country 
(held within the Eurozone) if the country was engaged in an ESM-supported 
adjustment program.   
The appropriate mechanism, we believe, would be an 
amendment to the 2012 Treaty Establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism (“T/ESM”).  Something along these lines: 
 
ARTICLE ___ 
Immunity from judicial process 
1. The assets and revenue streams of an 
ESM Member receiving stability support 
under this Treaty which are held in, 
originate from, or pass through the 
jurisdiction of an ESM Member shall not be 
subject to any form of attachment, 
garnishment, execution, injunctive relief, or 
similar forms of judicial process, in 
connection with a claim based on or arising 
out of a debt instrument that was eligible to 
participate in a restructuring of the debt of 
the beneficiary ESM Member after the 
effective date of this Treaty. 
2. The immunities provided in the preceding 
paragraph shall automatically expire when 
all amounts due to the ESM from the 
beneficiary ESM Member have been 
repaid in full. 
The objectives of such an amendment to the T/ESM would be: 
 to ensure that the financial support being provided by 
the ESM to one of its members is not diverted to the 
repayment of an existing debt obligation of that member 
that was eligible to participate in a debt restructuring but 
declined to do so; 
 to assist the beneficiary member state in any ESM-
approved restructuring of its debt by deflating the 
expectations of prospective holdouts that they will be 
able to extract a preferential recovery through the 
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pursuit of legal remedies after the restructuring closes; 
and  
 to provide a safe harbor in the Eurozone for the 
recipient state to hold its assets and conduct its 
financial affairs without fear of harassment by holdout 
creditors. 
An amendment of the T/ESM for this purpose would become 
effective within the jurisdiction of each of the Eurozone countries.  The 
potency of the measure would obviously be enhanced if other EU members, 
particularly the United Kingdom, were to enact comparable immunities in 
their domestic law.  A country such as the United Kingdom might for selfish 
reasons wish to incorporate such immunities into its own law; failure to do so 
could drive financial transactions away from London. 
The policy justification for such an amendment of the T/ESM is 
self-evident and compelling.  The ESM member states will be pouring 
taxpayer resources into a recipient country.  If a restructuring of private 
sector claims is deemed essential to restore that country to a sustainable 
position, the members funding that bailout should not wish to see the assets 
and revenue streams of the recipient sovereign being seized by creditors 
who elect not to participate in the restructuring.   Every euro that is so seized 
and applied toward the immediate repayment of such a claim will logically 
require a corresponding one euro increase in the amount of ESM bailout 
assistance. To put the matter into the geographic terms used earlier in this 
paper, this would amount to a funds transfer from Stuttgart, Germany to 
Greenwich, Connecticut.  The ESM members have a legitimate interest in 
minimizing such transfers. 
The precedent 
There is a precedent for just this sort of measure. 
In May 2003, following the coalition invasion of Iraq to oust 
Saddam Hussein, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 
1483 (May 22, 2003).7  Among other things, that Resolution encouraged the 
new government in Iraq to restructure the roughly $140 billion debt stock that 
Saddam had accumulated during his tenure.  In the context of “the 
desirability of prompt completion of the restructuring of Iraq’s debt”, the 
Resolution immunized all petroleum assets of Iraq against “any form of 
attachment, garnishment, or execution”, and clothed the proceeds of Iraqi oil 
sales (as well as the bank account into which the proceeds of all such oil 
sales were to be directed) with privileges and immunities identical to those 
enjoyed by the United Nations itself. 
                                                 
7
 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1483%282003%29 
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Resolution 1483 was enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations.  It was therefore binding on all members of the 
organization and the Resolution instructs each member state to “take any 
steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal systems 
to assure this protection” of Iraqi oil and financial assets.  These UNSC-
mandated immunities were periodically renewed and eventually expired on 
June 30, 2011.8  In Europe, the immunities for Iraqi assets were implemented 
through EU Regulation 1210/2003 (July 7, 2003) and amended from time to 
time thereafter in response to UNSC Resolutions.9 
It worked.  In late 2004, Iraq negotiated an 80% nominal 
writeoff of its debt owed to Paris Club countries and a long-term restructuring 
of the balance of the claims.  This translated into an 89.75 percent reduction 
in the net present value of those claims.  That same NPV haircut was then 
offered to the holders of roughly $21 billion of Saddam-era debt owed to 
private sector creditors and virtually all of those holders accepted it.  The 
UNSC-mandated immunization of Iraqi assets undoubtedly helped to 
dampen any hope that a better recovery could be achieved at the sharp end 
of a litigation.  
Broader implications 
An amendment of the T/ESM along the lines suggested above 
would, together with the other measures already taken within the Eurozone, 
substantially replicate the key features of most corporate insolvency regimes 
and would cover much of the ground that the IMF’s proposed Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism sought to address in 2002.  Specifically, 
 Supermajority creditor control of a future Eurozone sovereign debt 
workout will be effected through the use of the aggregated 
collective action clauses that the T/ESM mandates be included in 
all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013.  
Control of the workout process by a supermajority of affected 
creditors, and the ability to bind any dissident creditors to the will of 
that majority, is a fundamental feature of most insolvency regimes. 
 Supervision of the workout process will in practice be the province 
of the Troika (the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission) in 
much the same way as they have been doing in the bailouts of 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal.  This supervision implicitly covers 
issues such as assessing whether a debt restructuring is required 
in the debtor country, whether the terms proposed in any such 
restructuring are proportional to that country’s needs, whether the 
country is undertaking appropriate macroeconomic adjustment 
                                                 
8
 See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1956%282010%29 
9
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:169:0006:0023: En:PDF 
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measures, and whether the burden of the adjustment is being 
shared equitably among all stakeholders (citizens, creditors and 
official sector sponsors).  
 Although there will be no “automatic stay” preventing the initiation 
of creditor lawsuits against the sovereign debtor, the amendment 
to the T/ESM proposed above would effectively shield the debtor 
country’s Eurozone-based assets from compulsory seizure by 
holdout creditors. 
 
* * * * 
